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1Abstract
The highly publicized safeguard measures applied by the United States to an array of steel 
products in 2002 became one of the biggest and the most controversial trade disputes in recent 
history.  Virtually all major trading nations in the world, including European Communities, 
Japan, China, Brazil, Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland and Norway were the direct parties to 
this dispute with the United States.  The contentious legal grounds of the U.S. safeguard 
measures as well as the lack of adequate consultations between the United States and its 
trading counterparts have brought the international community close to a full-scale trade war.   
This paper considers the important legal issues debated in U.S. Steel Safeguards and discusses 
how the multilateral framework in the international trading system affected resolution of this 
case.   It also draws lessons for the future application of trade measures such as safeguards 
under the multilateral framework of international trading system.
2I. INTRODUCTION1
A multilateral trading system, as currently represented by the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”), operates based on mutually agreed concessions among trading nations, and its 
success would depend on their observance of those trade concessions previously negotiated 
and agreed upon among the members of the WTO system (“Members”).2  The GATT/WTO 
rules under certain conditions authorize trade measures that restrict imports unilaterally 
1
   Safeguard measures in international trade have received a growing academic attention in 
recent years. The author has published several articles and books on various issues of 
safeguard measures in international trade as the following: 
Reflections on the Agreement on Safeguards in the WTO 21(6) WORLD COMPETITION 25-31 
(co-authored with Jai S. Mah) (1998); Review of the First WTO Panel Case on the Agreement 
on Safeguards: Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products 
and Its Implications for the Application of the Agreement 33(6) JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE
27-46 (1999); Emergency Safeguard Measures under Article X in GATS – Applicability of the 
Concepts in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards 33(4) JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 47-59 
(1999); The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: Improvement on the GATT Article XIX?, 14(3) 
International Trade Journal 284-298 (2000); Critical Issues in the Application of the WTO 
Rules on Safeguards – In the Light of the Recent Panel Reports and the Appellate Body 
Decisions, 34 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 131-147 (2000); Destabilization of the Discipline on 
Safeguards? – Inherent Problems with the Continuing Application of Article XIX after the 
settlement of the Agreement on Safeguards 35 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 1235-1246 (2001);
Revival of Gray-Area Measures? - The U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement: Conflict 
with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, 36 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 155-166 (2002); 
Specific Safeguard Mechanism in the Protocol on China’s Accession to the WTO – A Serious 
Step Backward from the Achievement of the Uruguay Round 5 JOURNAL OF WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 219-231 (2002); Safeguard Measures: Why Are They Not Applied 
Consistently with the Rules? - Lessons for Competent National Authorities and Proposal for 
the Modification of the Rules on Safeguards, 36 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 641-673 (2002); 
SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL ANALYSIS (first edition 2003; second 
edition, forthcoming, 2004); The Agreement on Safeguards, THE KLUWER GUIDE TO THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (forthcoming, 2004).
2
 Article II of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) provides the Schedule of 
Concessions of Members, which sets the maximum tariff rates for each product classification.  
As the result of a series of multilateral trade negotiations, tariff rates for most non-primary 
products have been substantially reduced. The average tariff rate on non-primary products of 
industrial countries has been dropped to mere 3.9 percent after the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.  JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1997), at 74.
3beyond the bounds of those agreed concessions.3  The problem with unilateral import 
restrictions such as safeguard measures (of “safeguards”)4 is that such restrictions upset the 
balance of concessions previously negotiated between the importing and exporting Members.5
Maintaining balance of these concessions constitutes the core of the multilateral framework of 
the current international trading system.  The publicized safeguard measures recently applied 
by the United States to its imports of steel products (“U.S. Steel Safeguards”)6 have 
demonstrated how unilateral trade measures, motivated by internal politics without strong legal 
justifications under the GATT/WTO rules, may affect this multilateral framework and 
potentially lead to the destabilization of the trading system. 
On March 20, 2002, in response to the repeated requests from the ailing U.S. steel industry, the 
Bush Administration finally applied controversial safeguard measures.7  These measures 
3
 So-called administered protection, such as antidumping measures, countervailing measure, 
and safeguard measures are the examples of those trade measures.  The GATT/WTO rules, 
reprinted in WTO, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXT (1994), set the conditions for the trade measures.
4
 Safeguard measures are an emergency import restraint that is applicable where increased 
imports cause or threaten to cause serious injury to a domestic industry.  The WTO Agreement 
on Safeguards as well as Article XIX of the GATT provides the rules on safeguards.  See 
WTO, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE 
LEGAL TEXT, supra note 2, at 315-324, 518-519.
5
 Antidumping measures and countervailing measures are considered distinguished from 
safeguards, as those measures attempt to remedy injury caused by unfair trade practices such 
as dumping and illegal subsidy and therefore are not considered disrupting the balance of 
concessions among the exporting and importing countries.
6 United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products 
(“United States – Steel Safeguards” or “U.S. Steel Safeguards”), WT/DS248~DS259/R 
(Report of the Panel, dated July 11, 2003), WT/DS248~DS259/AB/R (Report of the Appellate 
Body, dated November 10, 2003). 
7
 These measures were announced in the Proclamation 7529 of March 5, 2002 - To Facilitate 
Positive Adjustment to Competition from Imports of Certain Steel Products (“Proclamation”) 
4comprised of tariff increases up to thirty percent ad valorem as well as a tariff-quota, to its 
imports of a range of steel products.8  These measures are among the most controversial and 
significant trade measures in its implications on world trade.  It was the first safeguard 
measures applied by a major economy against one of the most traded products in the world, 
affecting as much as 1.31 billion tons of steel trade per year.  Since the beginning of the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 1995 has no other trade measure ever provoked a more 
intense criticism and extensive resistance throughout the world.9   The U.S. steel safeguards 
were indeed perceived as a major protectionist attempt by the United States to serve its 
political interests without clear legal justifications under the GATT/WTO rules.10
The response of various steel-exporting Members to the U.S. steel safeguards was swift and 
resolute.  Only within two days after the U.S. announcement of the Steel Safeguards, the 
European Communities (“EC”) filed a complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
(“DSB”), already preparing a list of U.S. products subject to its retaliation.  Several other 
Members including Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, Venezuela, Norway and China also 
formally joined the EC in this dispute shortly afterwards.  The effect of the U.S. Steel 
and the Memorandum of March 5, 2002 - Action Under Section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 
Concerning Certain Steel Products by the President of the U.S. (“Memorandum”), Federal 
Register Vol. 67, No. 45 (Mar. 7 2002).
8
 The products subject to the U.S. safeguard measures included slabs, flat steel, hot-rolled bar, 
cold-finished bar, rebar, certain welded tubular products, carbon and alloy fittings, stainless 
steel bar, stainless steel rod, tin mill products and stainless steel wire.  Id.
9
 The U.S. steel safeguard measures attracted significant public attention worldwide, making 
headlines all over the world and invited strong objections from dozens of governments from 
Brasilia to London and from Seoul to Sidney.
10
 The political reasons behind the application of these U.S. safeguards as well as their 
inconsistencies with the relevant GATT/WTO rules legal problems are discussed infra.
5Safeguards seem to have gone even beyond the membership of the WTO, and it also seems to 
have affected Russia’s decision to ban imports of poultry from the United States.11  The 
subsequent consultations between the United States and the steel exporting countries have not 
produced any settlement on this dispute, and the WTO dispute settlement panel (“panel”) was 
established to review the U.S. measures and determine their consistency with the GATT/WTO 
rules.12
Why did the United States apply such controversial safeguard measures despite the worldwide 
criticism and resistance?   What was the political cause for those extraordinary measures and 
what were the legal issues in the application of those measures?  Safeguard measures are 
applied as import restrictions where increased imports cause or threaten to cause serious injury 
to a domestic industry.13 Safeguard measures are intended to assist Members to deal with the 
acute, short-term problems associated with the rapid increase in imports such as massive 
unemployment, by authorizing temporary import restraints until their domestic industry adjusts 
to the import competition.   Political considerations are an important factor in applying a 
11
 According to the media report, this decision came two days after Russian steel producers 
requested the government to block U.S. chicken imports, worth about $660 million last year, if 
the Bush administration imposed sanctions on Russian steel. LOS ANGELES TIME, March 2, 
2002.
12
 The U.S. Steel Safeguards is the considered the largest WTO panel case to date with most of 
the major economies in the world including the United States, European Communities, China, 
Japan, Brazil, Switzerland and New Zealand as the direct parties to the case.
13
 Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, reprinted in WTO, THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXT, supra note 2, 
at 315.  The author’s treatise on safeguards, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE 
LEGAL ANALYSIS (2003), supra note 1, also offers a detailed account of the conditions for the 
application of a safeguard measure.
6safeguard measure14.  Nonetheless, the measures will be justified as long as they are consistent 
with the requirement of the GATT/WTO rules on safeguards.  The next section provides a 
discussion of the background and development of U.S. Steel Safeguards. Then, the remainder 
of this paper addresses those legal issues raised in the application of the U.S. Steel Safeguards,
considers how the multilateral framework of the current international trading system operated 
to resolve the dispute and attempts to draw lessons for the future application of trade measures 
such as safeguards.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. STEEL SAFEGUARDS15
1. The State of the U.S. Steel Industry
The U.S. steel industry, which once symbolized the might of the U.S. industrial power, has been 
considered an industry in crisis.  During the latter half of the 20th century,  the U.S. steel industry 
lost its competitive edge against foreign steel producers who employed advanced production 
technologies and better facilities.16  The U.S. steel producers, having enjoyed the dominence in 
the domestic market for a long time through oligopoly did not make necessary investments to 
modernize their aging steel production facilities.17  As the result, the cost efficiency of U.S. steel 
production fell significantly below that of its competitors by 1970s.18
14 Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL ANALYSIS (2003), supra
note 1, chapter 1.3, at 10-14.  
15
 This section is developed based on the author’s own previous work, SAFEGUARD MEASURES 
IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 83-92.
16 WILLIAM H. BARRINGER AND KENNETH J. PIERCE, PAYING THE PRICE FOR BIG STEEL
(American Institute for International Steel, 2000), at 25-34.
17 Id.
18
 The unit cost per metric ton of steel in the United States was lower than that in Japan in 
1958 but became twice as high as that in Japan by 1976.  Id. Chart I-1. 
7Excessive labor costs also have been pointed out as another reason for the perceived inefficency 
of the U.S. steel industry. By 1958, the U.S. steel industry had already faced the highest unit 
labor costs in the world, which continued to increase throughout the latter half of the 20th
century, well exceeding the actual labor productivity.19  The outdated and inefficient production 
facilities particularly at old and smaller mills, coupled with excessive labor costs, drove the 
industry into the critical stages.  By 2001, affected by the worldwide over-production capacity, 
the steel price also dropped down to their lowest for twenty years.20  The U.S. steel producers 
sustained significant losses, and no fewer than 18 U.S. steel companies filed for bankruptcy 
between January 1998 and June 2001. This declining state of the U.S. steel industry resulted in 
significant job losses, as many as 5,000 in average a year since 1990.21
The job losses and the downward pressure on prices were not unique in the U.S. steel industry 
but prevalent throught the world due to the substantial increase in productivity and the resulting 
over-capacity.  Smaller mills became unprofitable and the economies of scale induced them to  
merge into more sizable ones, which then led to the excess production capacity. The existence of 
over-capacity, which was known to exceed as much as 20 percent22, caused a long-term 
downward trend in prices and made the condition of the steel industry particularly vulnerable to 
the demand fluctuations during general economic recessions.
19 Id., at 35 – 38.
20
 “A tricky business,” Economist, June 28, 2001.
21 Id.
22 Id.
8Facing this crisis, the well-organized U.S. steel producers asked the government for assistance.  
The U.S. government, affected by the significant political influence of the steel unions and 
producers, offered extensive assistance including various measures of trade protection as well as 
financial subsidies.  Steel products have undoubtely been more protected by trade measures such 
as numerous antidumping actions and countervailing duties than any other.23  In additon to the 
trade protection, the U.S. government granted enormous finaical support to the steel industry in 
tens of billions of dollars24, which also included pension bailouts, tax refunds, environmental 
regulation exemption subsidies, “Buy America” requirements and emergency loan guarantee 
schemes.25
The recent U.S. Steel Safeguards were considered yet another protection attempt in a long line 
of protections offered to this troubled industry, which delayed, rather than accelerated, the 
needed structural adjustment.  The application of the U.S. safeguard measures was considered 
particularly improper as safeguard measures are predicated on an increase in imports that 
23
 For instance, in 2002, the U.S. government applied about a half of the existing 264 
antidumping actions to the imports of steel products, although steel accounts for only 2 percent 
of total imports.  In addition, as many as 35 countervailing measures were also applied to steel 
products at the same time. United States International Trade Administration, Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Statistics, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders in effect as of 
July 26, 2002. <http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats>
24
 A recent study revealed that the steel lobby had won at least $16 billion ($21.8 billion in 
constant 1999 dollars) in federal subsidies for domestic steel makers from US taxpayers with 
additional billions received from state and local governments.  The steel industry also received 
additional billions from state and local governments. BARRINGER AND PIERCE, PAYING THE 
PRICE FOR BIG STEEL, supra note 16.
25 Id.
9causes or threatens to cause serious injury to the domestic industry, but the steel imports were 
reported as declining in recent years in most categories.26   Many believed that the U.S. Steel 
Safeguards were motivated primarily by the Bush Administration’s need for political support 
from the steel union for the upcoming Congressional elections as well as from the 
representatives of the steel producing regions for the Congressional bill giving the President 
trade negotiating (“Fast-Track”) authority.27
2. Development of U.S. Steel Safeguards
As mentioned above, U.S. Steel Safeguards faced strong and open oppositions from the major 
trading partners of the United States.28  What was alarming during the initial stages of the 
application of U.S. Steel Safeguards was that the United States seemed to have made little effort 
to avoid trade disputes with its concerned trading partners through adequate consultations.  The 
Agreement on Safeguards (“Safeguards Agreement” or “SA”) requires a Member proposing to 
apply a safeguard measure provide an adequate opportunity for prior consultations with those 
Members having a substantial interest.29   The consultation is required with a view to 
26
 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. imports of steel products decreased substantially 
from 34,433,707 metric tons in 2000 to 27,350,808 metric tons in 2001. U.S. Census Bureau, 
U.S. Imports for Consumption of Steel Products, Exhibit 1: All Steel Products (released 
February 21, 2002).
27
 In fact, after the Congressional vote on the trade promotion authority legislation, the 
Administration granted a large number of exemptions from the measures, which seems to 
provide support for this view.  These exemptions were criticized by U.S. steel producers and 
unions.  Bush Scales Back Tariffs on Steel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at A1. 
28
 Canada and Mexico did not raise any objection against U.S. Steel Safeguards since their 
steel exports were exempted from the safeguard list.
29
 The Agreement on Safeguards, art. 12.3, supra note 13.
10
exchanging views on the measure and reaching an understanding on ways to achieve the balance 
of concessions to be upset by the application of the safeguard.30
As discussed below, the United States did not provide adequate consultation opportunities 
sufficiently prior to its application of the steel safeguards.  Nevertheless, major steel exporting 
Members rushed to the consultations with the United States but failed to resolve the dispute 
between them. The United States’ major trading partners including, EC, China, Korea, Japan, 
New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway and Brazil requested an establishment of a panel to review 
the consistency of U.S. Steel Safeguards with the GATT/WTO rules, and the panel was 
subsequently established to review the biggest trade dispute in recent history.31 In addition, 
several Members, including the EC, Japan, China, Switzerland and Norway also proposed 
extensive retaliations against U.S. Steel Safeguards.32
The danger of a worldwide trade war, which could have been triggered by the application of a 
series of retaliatory measures, was averted as the United States subsequently agreed to reduce a 
number of steel products, as much as 25% in terms of tonnage, from its safeguards list,33 and in 
30 Id.  See Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 14, chapter 11.3 for 
more discussions on this issue.
31
 WTO docs WT/DS248/15, WT/DS249/9, WT/DS251/10, WT/DS252/8, WT/DS253/8, 
WT/DS254/8, WT/DS258/12, WT/DS259/11 (August 12, 2002)
32
 WTO docs G/SG/43 (May 15, 2002), G/SG/44 (May 21, 2002), G/SG/45 (May 21, 2002), 
G/SG/46 (May 21, 2002), G/SG/47 (May 22, 2002)
33
 WTO docs G/SG/N/10/USA/6/Suppl.7, G/SG/N/11/USA/5/Suppl.7 (September 17, 2002). 
Despite the position of the U.S. government that the exclusion was based on the U.S. 
consumer need and on the determination that the exclusion would not undermine the 
effectiveness of the safeguard measure, it was widely considered that the purpose of the 
11
consideration of these U.S. concessions, the application of retaliatory measures were suspended.  
The WTO panel subsequently found that U.S. Steel Safeguards were not consistent with the 
relevant GATT/WTO rules.34  The United States appealed this panel decision, and the Appellate 
Body largely upheld the panel decision albeit with some modifications35, which was 
subsequently accepted by the United States.  As the result, the proposed retaliatory measures 
against the U.S. exports were never put into effect, and the United States ubsequently withdrew 
the Steel Safeguards.36
While the U.S. concessions and final withdrawal of the Steel Safeguards prevented a direct trade 
war, the controversial U.S. Steel Safeguards have also triggered protectionism in other countries. 
Fearing possible diversion of steel products from the protected U.S. market, Members including 
the EC, China and Hungary applied provisional safeguard measures againt their own steel 
products while initiating investigations for definitive safeguard measures.37 The EC has made an 
affirmative injury determination and also decided to apply a definitive safeguard measure on 
imports of seven steel products.38  Hungary and China also applied their own safeguards.39
exclusion is to avoid serious trade conflict with the major trading partners of the United States. 
Tariff Exemptions Expanded, WASHINGTON POST, August 23, 2002, at E02.
34
 Report of the Panel, supra note 6.  The author also expressed a view that U.S. Steel 
Safeguards were inconsistent with the relevant GATT/WTO rules. Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD 
MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 14, at 166-168.
35
 Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 6
36
 WTO doc. G/SG/N/10/USA/6/Suppl.8 (December 12, 2003)
37
 WTO docs G/SG/N/7/EEC/1 (April 2, 2002); G/SG/N/7/CHN/1 (May 23, 2002); 
G/SG/N/7/HUN/1 (May 23, 2002)
38
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1694/2002 of September 27, 2002 imposing definitive 
safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products. See also the EC notification to 
the Committee on Safeguards, G/SG/N/8/EEC/1, G/SG/N/10/EEC/1 (September 11, 2002).
12
Canada, whose steel exports were not subject to U.S. Steel Safeguards, also initiated an 
investigation for the application of a safeguard measure and subsequently made a positive injury 
determination.40 Several other Members, including Chile, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Poland, 
and Bulgaria have followed their lead and also initiated investigations for safeguard measures 
against steel products, creating the danger of the “worldwide steel protections”.
The worst scenario, which leads to a downward sprawl of “protections” one after another, were 
clearly in sight. This dangerous sign of the worldwide protectionism, triggered by U.S. Steel 
Safeguards, created a significant concern for preserving the multilateralism in the world trading 
system for freer trade, which consists of the respect for mutual concessions and the multilateral 
legal framework. Surely, the multilateralism in interntional trade will not be sustainable in an 
environment where unilateral protectionism is rampant.  Particularly, the successful application 
of a safeguard measure in the absence of adequate legal justifications may tempt other trading 
nations to do the same in order to protect their own domestic producers, in fact causing the 
worldwide protectionism.  Therefore, it is necessary to review the legal justifications for U.S. 
Steel Safeguards under the WTO rules.  The nest section does so with reference to the relevant 
GATT/WTO rules, namely Article XIX of the GATT and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards41.
39
  WTO docs G/SG/N/10/HUN/1 (April 7, 2003), G/SG/N/CHN/1 (November 5, 2002)
40
  WTO docs G/SG/N/6/CAN/1 (April 2, 2002), G/SG/N/8/CAN/1 (July 19, 2002).  However 
Canada did not decide to apply the safeguard measure.
41 Supra note 4.
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III. LEGAL ISSUES IN THE APPLICATION OF U.S. STEEL SAFEGUARDS
1. Unforeseen Developments 
Paragraph 1(a) of Article XIX of the GATT provides, 
“If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred 
by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product 
is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased 
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party 
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to extent and for such time as may be 
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in 
part or to withdraw or modify the concession.” (Emphasis added.)
The underlined “unforeseen developments” clause is not included in the subsequent 
Agreement on Safeguards42, and a question rose as to whether this particular clause imposes 
any substantive legal requirement on a Member applying a safeguard measure.43  In response 
42
 Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which lays out the general conditions for the 
application of a safeguard measure, does not include this “unforeseen development clause”.  It 
provides,
“A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has 
determined that such product is being imported into its territory in such increased 
quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to 
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or 
directly competitive products.” (Footnote omitted.)
43
 This question was first raised in the WTO panel cases, Korea - Definitive Safeguard 
Measure on the Imports of Certain Dairy Products (“Korea – Dairy Products”), WT/DS98/R, 
(Report of the Panel, dated June 21, 1999), WT/DS98/AB/R, (Report of the Appellate Body, 
dated December 14, 1999); Argentina - Safeguard Measure on the Imports of Footwear
(“Argentina – Footwear”), WT/DS121/R, (Report of the Panel, dated June 25, 1999), 
WT/DS121/AB/R, (Report of the Appellate Body, dated 14, 1999).  The following WTO 
dispute cases also concern safeguard measures, which are referenced throughout this paper:  
United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten From the 
European Communities (“United States – Wheat Gluten”), WT/DS166/R, (Report of the Panel, 
dated July 31, 2000), WT/DS166/AB/R, (Report of the Appellate Body, dated December 22, 
2000); United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb 
Meat from New Zealand and Australia (“United States – Lamb Meat”), WT/DS177/R, 
WT/DS178/R (Report of the Panel, dated December 21, 2000), WT/DS177/AB/R, 
WT/DS178/AB/R (Report of the Appellate Body, dated May 1, 2001); United States –
14
to this question, the Appellate Body of the WTO DSB (“Appellate Body”) ruled that a 
Member applying a safeguard measure must demonstrate as a matte of fact the existence of 
“unforeseen developments” that led to the increase in imports causing serious injury or its 
threat to the domestic industry, in pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Article XIX.44
There has been a controversy as to whether this “unforeseen developments” clause should be 
considered imposing any legal requirement at all.  In fact, the panels in Korea – Dairy 
Products and Argentina – Footwear did not consider that the “unforeseen developments” 
clause in Article XIX creates any legal obligation,45 and the justification of the Appellate Body 
Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Steel Wire Rod and Circular Welded Carbon 
Quality Line Pipe (“United States – Line Pipe”), WT/DS202/R (Report of the Panel, dated 
October 29, 2001), WT/202/AB/R (Report of the Appellate Body, dated February 15, 2002); 
Chile –Price Band System and Safeguard Measures relating to Certain Agricultural Products
(“Chile – Agricultural Products”), WT/DS207/R (Report of the Panel, dated May 3, 2002) (the 
issues in the case relating to safeguards were not appealed); Argentina – Definitive Safeguard 
Measure on Imports of Preserved Peaches (“Argentina – Preserved Peaches”), WT/DS238/R 
(Report of the Panel, dated February 14, 2003) (the panel rulings not appealed); United States 
– Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (“United States – Steel 
Products”), WT/DS248~DS259/R (Report of the Panel, dated July 11, 2003), 
WT/DS248~DS259/AB/R (Report of the Appellate Body, dated November 10, 2003).
44 Korea – Dairy Products, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 90, Argentina –
Footwear, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 97, United States – Lamb Meat, 
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, paras 72 and 73.
45 Korea – Dairy Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 7.42, Argentina –
Footwear, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 8.69.  As discussed above, the Appellate 
Body reversed those panel positions and ruled that the “unforeseen developments” clause does 
create an affirmative legal obligation to prove the existence of “unforeseen developments”. Id.
15
ruling on this issue has been questioned.46   Despite this controversy, the Appellate Body’s 
position remained unchanged, and the subsequent panels also had followed this ruling.47
The complainants argued that the United States had failed to comply with this requirement to 
demonstrate “unforeseen developments”.48  The United States disagreed and claimed that it 
had identified the unforeseen developments and therefore complied with this requirement.49
The Panel considered this issue, following the standard of review previously affirmed by the 
Appellate Body50 that “the Panel must examine whether the United States demonstrated in its 
published report, through a reasoned and adequate explanation, that unforeseen developments 
and the effects of tariff concessions resulted in increased imports causing or threatening to 
cause serious injury to the relevant domestic producers.”51 (Footnote omitted.)
The United States argued that it identified the financial crises that engulfed Southeast Asia 
(Asian crisis) and the former USSR (Russian crisis), the continued strength of the United 
46
 For the controversy about the “unforeseen developments” clause and the applicability of 
Article XIX, see Y.S. Lee, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL ANALYSIS, 
supra note 1, at 101-107.
47
 Pursuant to the Appellate Body ruling, the recent panel in Argentina – Preserved Peaches
recognized Members’ obligation to demonstrate “unforeseen developments”.  
48 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 10.32.
49 Id., para. 10.33.
50 United States – Lamb Meat, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, paras 103-106.
51 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 10.38.  Citing also 
the previous Appellate Body rulings, the Panel stated that it would also examine, in application 
of its standard of review, whether the competent authorities "considered all the relevant facts 
and had adequately explained how the facts supported the determinations that were made.” 
(Footnote omitted.) Id. para. 10.39.  The Appellate Body subsequently affirmed this Panel 
approach. United States – Steel Products, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 
279.
16
States' market and persistent appreciation of the US dollar, and the confluence of all of these 
events as unforeseen developments.52  The complainants considered that none of these events 
constituted unforeseen developments nor did any combination of them.53  The issue was 
further compounded by the fact that the original report of the United States International Trade 
Commission (“USITC”)54, which included a discussion of the Asian and Russian crises, did 
not specifically address the issue of “unforeseen developments”, and the Second 
Supplementary Report was subsequently issued to address this issue.55  The complainants 
argued that this supplementary report should be disregarded as it did not comprise the original 
USITC report and was an ex port attempt to demonstrate the existence of “unforeseen 
developments.”56
Article 3.1 of the SA provides in the relevant part, “…The competent authorities shall publish 
a report setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues 
of fact and law.” (Emphasis added.)  The strictly literal interpretation of this clause, “a report 
setting forth…findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and 
law” seems to indicate that the national authority must publish a comprehensive single report 
52 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 10.40.
53 Id.
54 Steel, USITC Pub. No.3479 (December 2001).
55 Id., para. 10.47.
56 Id.
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basing its decision on a safeguard measure and that the multiple reports do not seem consistent 
with this provision.57
With respect to the multiplicity of the investigation report, the Panel considered that the 
national authority’s report may be produced in parts as long as they form a coherent and 
integrated explanation providing satisfaction with the requirements of Article XIX and the 
Agreement on Safeguards.58   With respect to the issue of “unforeseen developments”, the 
Panel, citing the previous Appellate Body decision59, considered that the demonstration of the 
unforeseen developments must be made prior to the application of a safeguard measure, and as 
the Supplementary Report was published before the application of the U.S. steel safeguards, it 
believed that the demonstration of the unforeseen developments attempted in the 
Supplementary Report was not necessarily made in an untimely fashion60 although its 
adequacy was a separate issue.  The Panel, therefore, accepted the Supplementary Report as 
part of the investigation report for its examination.
In assessing the USITC’s explanation of the unforeseen developments, the Panel first 
considered its explanation of why they were unforeseen and then moved on to consider the 
explanation of how the unforeseen developments resulted in increased imports.61  These 
57
 For a further discussion of the adequacy of an investigation report, refer to Y.S. LEE, 
SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 1, at 144-145.
58 Id., para. 10.50.
59 United States – Lamb Meat, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 72.
60 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 10.54.
61 Id., para 10.69.
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considerations were applied to each of the following four events and to the confluence of those 
events as explained by the United States, namely, the Asian financial crisis which began 1997, 
the Russian financial crisis, the strength of the U.S. market and the appreciation of U.S. dollar.
With respect to the Asian financial crisis, the Panel considered that the United States 
demonstrated that this event was not foreseen as it took place well after the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round.62  As to the Russian financial crisis, the unforeseen developments, as 
identified by the USITC, were the "unanticipated financial difficulties", which, in particular, 
were the "intense financial disruptions and currency fluctuations" between 1996 and 1999, 
resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union.63  The Panel accepted, arguendo, that there 
may have been, between 1996 and 1999, unforeseen financial disruptions and currency 
fluctuations linked to the USSR dissolution that were thus unforeseen at the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round.64
With respect to the strength of the U.S. market as well as the appreciation of U.S. dollars vis-à-
vis other foreign currencies attracting imports, the Panel was of the view that the USITC 
considered neither of those factors a stand-alone “unforeseen developments” but considered 
them along with the other alleged unforeseen developments and as part of a set of world events 
62
 The parties agreed that the point in time at which developments should have been 
unforeseen is that of the completion of the Uruguay Round.  Id., para. 10.74.
63 Id., para. 10.83.
64 Id. para. 10.85.
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which together constituted unforeseen developments.65  Therefore, the Panel did not consider 
that it had to determine whether or not such factors could distinctively constitute unforeseen 
developments.66  The Panel acknowledged that the confluence of those factors could also be 
considered an unforeseen development within the context of Article XIX.67
In the second phase assessment of the unforeseen development issue (i.e. how the unforeseen 
developments resulted in increased imports), the Panel, following the previous Appellate Body 
position68, considered that the logical connection between the unforeseen developments and 
the increased imports must be demonstrated.69  In the Panel’s review, the logical connection 
was not made properly in the USITC Report.  In the Panel’s view, the identification and 
discussion of those events in the initial USITC Report were not made within the context of an 
explanation of whether they constituted unforeseen developments and whether they resulted in 
increased imports causing injury: i.e. no logically coherent explanation was made to establish 
the link between the unforeseen developments and the increase in imports.70
The Panel also considered that the Secondary Supplementary Report only states the overall 
effects of the Asian and Russian financial crisis together with the strong US dollar and 
65 Id., paras 10.89, 10.93.
66 Id. para. 10.94.
67 Id. para. 10.100.
68
 Reports of the Appellate Body, Argentina – Footwear, supra note 43, para. 92, Korea –
Daily Products, para. 85.
69 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 10.104.
70 Id. para. 10.116.  The Panel also noted that the initial USITC Report does not even 
specifically refer to the issue of unforeseen developments, and there are only ad hoc references 
to the Asian and Russian financial crises.  Id. paras 10.116 - 10.118.  
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economy to displace steel to other markets without any specific data to support this USITC 
conclusion.71  In affirming the Panel decision, the Appellate Body also emphasized the 
national investigating authority’s obligation to provide reasoned conclusions with respect to 
unforeseen developments and that it is not for panels to find support for such conclusions ‘by 
cobbling together disjointed references scattered throughout a competent authority's report.’72
The Panel acknowledged that the USITC Report described a plausible set of unforeseen 
developments that may have resulted in increased imports to the United States from various 
sources, but in the Panel’s view, it failed to demonstrate that such developments actually 
resulted in increased imports into the United States causing serious injury to the domestic 
producers.73  On appeal, the United States argued that the Panel had failed to consider the 
relevant data in other sections of the USITC Report to support the USITC's finding that 
"unforeseen developments" had resulted in increased imports.  The Appellate Body denied that 
the Panel had such obligation as it is for the national investigating authority and not for the 
Panel to provide the adequate, coherent reasoning.74
The Panel also considered that the USITC’s determination of “unforeseen developments” is 
inadequate since it was not made with respect to the specific steel products at issue.75   The 
consideration of the relevant steel products would have been necessary since the steel 
71 Id. paras 10.121 - 10.123.
72 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 326.
73 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, paras 10.121 and 10.123.
74 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 329.
75 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, paras 10.124 - 10.126.
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producers in the United States were of the view that the effect was different on different steel 
products at issue.76 The Appellate Body also affirmed the Panel decision that the investigating 
authority must demonstrate “unforeseen developments” with each product subject to a 
safeguard measure.77
Despite the panel and the Appellate Body decision, it is not altogether clear that the 
requirement of “unforeseen developments” is justified.  The history of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations on the safeguard rules suggests that the negotiators did not intend to include the 
“unforeseen developments” clause as a legal requirement in the new safeguard disciplines by 
not including it from the draft agreement while they repeated all important provisions in the 
new Agreement.78  In fact, there has been an argument as to whether the old safeguard rules 
under Article XIX are still applicable even after the settlement of the Agreement on 
Safeguards at all.79
The ambiguous nature of the “unforeseen developments” clause is another problem. The term 
used in the original clause is “unforeseen” and not “unforeseeable”, which refers to the 
76 Id., paras 10.127.
77 Id., para. 316.
78
 In the initial draft agreement, the “unforeseen developments” clause was included, and a 
1990 draft amplified it by specifying the obligation to establish an “unforeseen, sudden and 
significant increase”.  By mid-1990, this clause was removed from the text altogether since 
both the United States and European Communities objected this terminology of being too 
difficult and restrictive to apply. PIERRE DIDIER, LES PRICIPAUX ACCORDS DE L’OMC ET LEUR 
TRANSOPOSITION DANS LAW COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENE (1997), at 271-272.  For further 
discussions of the history of safeguard rules, see Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD 
TRADE, supra note 1, chapter 3.
79 Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 1, chapter 8.1.
22
subjective, rather than objective, state of perception about the future event. The Appellate 
Body, having acknowledged this subjectivity, made a distinction between “unforeseen” and 
“unforeseeable”.80 Nonetheless, the Panel in U.S. Steel Safeguards considered that the standard 
is not what the specific negotiators at trade concessions had in mind, rather what they could 
have reasonably expected,81 which seems to blur the earlier distinction made by the Appellate 
Body between “unforeseen” and “unforeseeable”.  It is doubtful that there can be any clear 
standard to determine “unforeseen developments”, without deviating from the language in the 
provision, which indicates the subjective understanding of the event.82 Certain provisions in
the SA also seem drafted on the presumption the SA is the sole articulation of the international 
rules on safeguards.83 The controversies surrounding the requirement of “unforeseen 
developments” under old Article XIX would seem to continue beyond U.S. Steel Safeguards.
2. Increase in Imports
Safeguard measures are predicated on increased imports.  Emergency import restraints such as 
safeguards would be difficult to justify without a significant increase in imports.  Article 2.1 of 
the SA provides in the relevant part, “A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product 
80 Korea –Dairy Products, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 84.  
81 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 10.43.
82
 For more discussion, see Y.S. Lee, Destabilization of the Discipline on Safeguards? –
Inherent Problems with the Continuing Application of Article XIX after the settlement of the 
Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 1, at 1236-1242, Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN 
WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 101-107.
83 See Y.S. Lee, Destabilization of the Discipline on Safeguards? – Inherent Problems with the 
Continuing Application of Article XIX after the settlement of the Agreement on Safeguards,
supra note 1, at 1236-1242, Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL 
ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 101-107.
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only if that Member has determined that such product is being imported into its territory in 
such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces 
like or directly competitive products.” (Emphasis added.)  The increase in imports is also a 
part of the injury test discussed below. “The rate and amount of the increase in imports of the 
product concerned in absolute and relative terms” is one of the eight factors to consider for the 
injury determination under Article 4.2(a) of the SA.  
U.S. Steel Safeguards were controversial because, inter alia, there was a significant dispute as 
to the existence of such increase in steel imports.  The general steel import statistics seemed to 
show decreasing, rather than increasing import trends toward the end of the investigating 
period.  For instance, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. imports of steel products 
decreased substantially from 34,433,707 metric tons in 2000 to 27,350,808 metric tons in 
2001.84  Of course, this is aggregated statistics of all steel products, and the increase in imports 
needs to be considered with respect to each specific product subject to the safeguard.  The 
Panel reviewed the U.S. determination on the increased imports with respect to the steel 
products subject to U.S. Steel Safeguards.
With respect to the increased imports, the Panel considered that the increase must indicate “a 
certain degree of recentness, suddenness, sharpness and significance”, following the previous 
84
 U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Imports for Consumption of Steel Products, Exhibit 1 “All Steel 
Products” (released February 21, 2002).
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Appellate Body decision in Argentina - Footwear.85  Nonetheless, the Panel, in agreement with 
the Panel’s view in United States – Line Pipe, also considered that the increase in imports need 
not continue up to the period immediately preceding the investigating authority's 
determination, nor up to the very end of the period of investigation, although the increase still 
has to be “recent”.86  The Panel considered that the question as to whether a decrease in 
imports at the end of the period of investigation prevents a finding of increased imports would 
depend on the duration and the degree of the decrease at the end of the relevant period of 
investigation, as well as the nature of the increase that intervened beforehand reflected by, for 
instance, its sharpness and the extent.87  The Panel also found that the national investigating 
authority is not obligated to consider the data made available after its determination of 
increased imports.88
The Panel in U.S. Steel Safeguards made measure-by- measure assessments on the USITC 
determinations with respect to each specific product.  Regarding certain carbon flat-rolled steel 
(CCRFS), hot-rolled bar, and stainless steel rod, the Panel found that the USITC failed to 
provide an adequate and reasoned explanation of how the facts supported its determination of 
increased imports under Article 2.1.  The decreasing import trends toward the end of 
investigation period, particularly the significant drop in the interim 2001 were noted, and the 
85 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 10.167.  The 
Appellate Body subsequently confirmed this Panel position. United States – Steel Products, 
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 361.
86
 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 10.162.
87 Id., para. 10.163.
88 Id., para. 10.173.
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claimed increases in imports during the investigation period were not considered recent 
enough.89 The Appellate Body, emphasizing the national investigating authority’s 
responsibility to examine import trends, agreed with the Panel findings with respect to those 
products.90
On the other hand, the Panel found that the USITC provided an adequate and reasoned 
explanation of increased imports with respect to cold-finished bar, rebar, welded pipe, fittings, 
flanges and tool joints (FFTJ) and stainless steel bar where there were significant increases in 
imports in the recent past from the determination as supported by the overall trends (e.g. sharp 
increases followed by relatively insignificant drops).91  The Panel emphasized that the 
fulfillment of the requirement of increased imports under Article 2.1 does not mean that such 
increases are sufficient to cause serious injury to a domestic industry.  The Panel considered 
that this question should be considered in the context of causation under Article 4.2(b) as 
discussed below.92
With respect to tin mill products and stainless steel wire, the Panel noted that the USITC 
Commissioners made divergent findings that are, in the view of the Panel, impossible to 
89 Id., paras 10.178 - 10.187, 10.201 -10.210, 10.264 – 10.277.  
90 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, paras 369, 376, 
383, 399.  The Appellate Body did not share a particular aspect of the Panel conclusion with 
respect to stainless steel rod, but it nonetheless supported the Panel finding that the United 
States failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how the facts supported its 
determination of increased imports of this product. Id., paras 395 – 399.
91 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, paras 10.214 – 10.215, 
10.224, 10.233, 10.244, 10.253-10.254.   
92 Id., para. 10.255.
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reconcile given that they were based on differently defined products.93 (Some Commissioners 
considered that those products should be included together in a larger category of products and 
the others considered them separate products.  They were also divergent on injury 
determinations.)   The Panel considered that a Member is not allowed to base under Articles 
2.1 and 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards a safeguard measure “on a determination 
supported by a set of explanations each of which is different and impossible to reconcile with 
the other.”94  Here, the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel and reversed its decision, 
concluding that the affirmative findings based on different product groupings are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive.95  The Appellate Body was of the view that nothing in the SA 
prevents the national investigating authority from setting out multiple findings to support its 
determination and that it is the Panel’s obligation to consider each of them to assess if any one 
of them provides a reasoned and adequate explanation of its final determination.96
This Appellate Body decision raises certain doubt as to the proper assessment of the national 
authority’s determination of increased imports in the presence of divergent opinions within 
93 Id., para. 10.194.  The Panel further explained, “For the purposes of the Agreement on 
Safeguards, with regard to, for instance, the question of whether imports have increased, it 
makes a difference whether the product at issue is tin mill or a much broader category called 
CCFRS and containing tin mill products.  The difference is that the import numbers for 
different product definitions will not be the same.” Id., para. 10.195.  With respect to stainless 
steel wire, Id., para. 10.261.
94 Id., paras 10.195,10.262 
95
 The Appellate Body stated, “We do not believe that an affirmative finding with respect to a 
broad product grouping, on the one hand, and an affirmative finding with respect to one of the 
products contained in that broad product grouping, on the other hand, are, necessarily, 
mutually exclusive.” United States – Steel Products, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 
43, para 413.
96 Id. para. 414.
27
them.  The Appellate Body stated, “the Panel should have continued its enquiry by examining 
the views of the three Commissioners separately,  in order to ascertain whether one of these 
sets of findings contained a reasoned and adequate explanation for the USITC's "single 
institutional determination" on tin mill products.”97 (Emphasis added.) Does this mean that the 
Panel should conclude that the investigating authority has provided a reasoned conclusion even 
if the multiple explanations offered for the same determination could not be reconciled and 
only one of them is found adequate and reasonable to support the determination?  If so, is this 
position consistent with the relevant requirement under the SA?
Article 3.1 provides in the relevant part, “The competent authorities shall publish a report 
setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact 
and law.”  (Emphasis added.)  How can such reasoned conclusions be made if the 
explanations offered for the “single institutional determination”98 cannot be reconciled with 
one another?  The Appellate Body considered that the relevant provisions in the SA may not 
necessarily prevent presentation of multiple explanations on the part of the national authorities.  
Nevertheless, what is subject to the Panel assessment is the adequacy of the explanations 
offered by the national investigating authority to support its own determination and not that of 
each explanation by the individual members of these authorities.  
97 Id. para. 416.
98 Id.
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Then, how can the national investigating authority be considered having offered an adequate 
and reasonable explanation if it presented multiple explanations that cannot be reconciled with 
each other?   Should it be the Panel’s responsibility to find for the national investigating 
authority an explanation that is adequate and reasonable among many that are not even 
reconciled with each other or is it within the national investigating authority’s responsibility 
under Article 3.1 to present coherent explanations to support its own decision after internally 
reconciling whatever disagreements that the members within the authority may have?  The 
further judicial clarification would seem necessary on this point.
3. Parallelism
One of the most important policy decisions made in the settlement of the SA is the elimination 
of discriminatory and arbitrary import restrictions.99 One of the hardest questions during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations with respect to safeguards was whether a Member should be 
allowed to apply a safeguard measure selectively, according to the origin of the imported 
product.100  After long negotiations, the participants finally agreed to apply safeguards 
regardless of the source of imports to prevent arbitrary discriminations.  Article 2.2 of the SA 
provides, “Safeguard measures shall be applied to a product being imported irrespective of its 
source.” (Emphasis added.)  This provision affirms the MFN application of safeguard 
99
 These measures called “gray-area measures” were prevalent during 1970s and 80s, and 
Article 11 of the SA prohibits all kinds of gray-area measures.  For further discussions of gray-
area measures, see Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 1, chapters 
3.2 and 8.4.
100
 For more discussions of the negotiation process for the settlement of the SA, see Id., 
chapter 3.
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measures and does not in principle allow Members to discriminate among exporters in 
applying safeguards.
On the other hand, a Member may well wish to exclude the imports from another Member that 
it has a free trade agreement (“FTA”) with.  In accordance with its own free trade agreements, 
the United States exempted steel imports from Canada, Mexico, Israel and Jordan from its 
application of the Steel Safeguards.101  Prior to U.S. Steel Safeguards, The WTO panels and 
the Appellate Body had already made it clear that the MFN requirement of Article 2 does not 
allow a Member to consider injury based on imports from all sources and then exempt the 
imports from some countries from the scope of its safeguard measure.102  By this requirement, 
the parallelism between the scope of injury assessment and the scope of the application of the 
safeguard is imposed.  The Appellate Body ruled that any gap between the scope of injury 
assessment and the scope of safeguard measure is justified only if the Member establishes 
explicitly that imports from sources covered by the measure satisfy the conditions for the 
application of a safeguard measure, as set out in Article 2.1 and elaborated in Article 4.2 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards.103
101
 Proclamation No. 7529 of 5 March 2002, "To Facilitate Positive Adjustment to 
Competition from Imports of Certain Steel Products", Federal Register, Vol. 67, No. 45, 7 
March 2002, paras 8 and 11.
102 United States – Wheat Gluten, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, paras 8.176-8.178, 
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, paras 98-100.  United States – Line Pipe, Report 
of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, paras 178-181.
103 United States – Line Pipe, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para 183.
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Therefore, the exemption in U.S. Steel Safeguards would be inconsistent with the requirement 
of parallelism under Article 2.2 unless the United States made a positive injury determination 
based solely on the imports from the other countries that were not exempted from its 
safeguards.  The Panel also found that when the determination and the eventual measure do not 
correspond in terms of the scope, Members can (and must) establish explicitly that imports 
from sources covered satisfy the conditions for safeguard action.104 The United States 
contended that the USITC's analysis in the Second Supplementary Report, read in conjunction
with the initial USITC Report, satisfies the requirement of parallelism.105
There was a debate as to what amounts to a finding that establishes explicitly that imports from 
sources covered by the measure satisfy the conditions for a safeguard measure.106 The United 
States indicated that the competent authorities' formal conclusion as to whether non-FTA 
imports have caused serious injury is sufficient and not an “explicit” recitation of the results of 
each step of the analytical process leading to that conclusion.107  The Panel disagreed and 
considered that the competent authorities must provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of 
how the facts support their determination that the products covered in the measure alone have 
caused serious injury to the domestic industry.108
104 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para 10.592.  The 
United States argued that there is no requirement for the explicit establishment in the SA, but 
the Appellate Body affirmed the Panel position. United States – Steel Products, Report of the 
Appellate Body, supra note 43, para 444.
105
 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para 10.587.
106 Id., para. 10.594.
107 Id. See note 104 supra.
108 Id. para. 10.195-10.196.
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The Panel made measure-by- measure assessments to determine whether the United States 
fulfilled the requirement of parallelism.  With respect to all product categories, the Panel found 
that the United States failed to establish explicitly that imports from the sources included in the 
application of these measures fulfilled the conditions for the application of a safeguard 
measure.  In fact, the United States did not take the required analytical steps under the SA to 
establish that the imports not exempted from the safeguards alone have caused injury to the 
domestic industry.  A few paragraphs in the Second Supplementary Report commenting on the 
effect of the exclusion were considered insufficient and rather conclusory, lacking adequate 
reasoning and explanations.109  The Panel considered in particular that the causal effects of 
excluded imports were not adequately addressed under Article 4.2(b) of the SA.110
109
 With respect to CCFRS, the Panel noted analytical flaws with the USITC report. First, the 
causal effects of the excluded products were not adequately considered.  Second, the USITC 
discussion of “non-NAFTA imports” still included the imports from Israel and Jordan, which 
were excluded from the Steel Safeguards and therefore should have been excluded along with 
NAFTA imports in the USITC analysis.  Id., paras 10.601 – 10.609.  The Panel made the same 
conclusions with respect to the other eight product categories. Id., paras 10.623, 10.633, 
10.643, 10.653, 10.660, 10.670, 10.680, 10.692.  The split of opinions among the USITC 
Commissioners with respect to tin mill products and stainless steel wire were also noted.  The 
Panel did not make the causation analysis on stainless steel rod, but the Panel also concluded 
that the USITC’s implicit and cursory determination did not amount to the reasoned and 
adequate explanation required under Articles 2 and 4 of the SA. Id., para 10.699.
110
 Article 4.2(b) of the SA provides, “The determination referred to in subparagraph (a) 
(injury determination) shall not be made unless the investigation demonstrates, on the basis of 
objective evidence, the existence of the causal link between increased imports of the product 
concerned and serious injury or threat thereof.  When factors other than increased imports are 
causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to 
increased imports.” (Explanation added.)  The issue of causation will be discussed further 
infra.  
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On appeal, the United States argued that nothing in the SA requires a distinct or explicit
analysis of imports from sources not subject to the measure.111  The Appellate Body affirmed 
the Panel position, stating that the imports excluded from the application of the safeguard 
measure must be considered a factor "other than increased imports" within the meaning of 
Article 4.2(b).112  The Appellate Body found that the possible injurious effects that these 
excluded imports may have on the domestic industry must not be attributed to imports 
included in the safeguard measure pursuant to Article 4.2(b).113 The Appellate Body was also 
of the view that the Member must make a single joint determination, rather than making 
separate and partial determinations, of the injurious impact of the imports included in the 
measure by excluding imports from all countries that have been excluded from the safeguards, 
although imports from some of those countries are very small and almost non-existent.114
This Panel and Appellate Body decisions on the requirement parallelism imposes considerable 
analytical steps on a Member applying a safeguard measure with the exclusion of imports from 
some of its trading partners.  For instance, the United States has a treaty obligation to exempt 
under certain conditions the imports from its trading partners from its safeguard measures that 
it has a free trading agreement with.115   It appears from the relevant Panel and the Appellate 
Body decisions that a Member may in fact exempt imports from certain countries from the 
safeguard measure as long as the requirement of the parallelism is met, as discussed above.  
111 United States – Steel Products, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para 447.
112 Id., para. 450.  See also note 110 supra.
113 Id.
114 Id., para. 468.
115
 NAFTA Implementation Act,  §312
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This raises an interesting question with respect to the MFN application of a safeguard measure 
as follows.  No panel and the Appellate Body decisions required the existence of free trading 
agreement or any other condition in addition to the parallelism as the prerequisite for the 
product exclusions.  Then, would a Member be allowed to target imports from a small number 
of counties, even without the presence of a FTA with them, as long as the Member explicitly 
establishes that the imports from those countries alone cause or threaten to cause serious injury 
to the domestic industry?   If so, would it not undermine the principle of the MFN application 
of safeguards?  It is still arguable that this “selective application” of a safeguard measure is 
different from the arbitrary and discriminatory application of gray-area measures in the past 
since the Member will still have to satisfy the injury and causation requirements under the SA.  
On the other hand, the Panel in Line Pipe considered that the authorization of a free trading 
area under GATT Article XXIV is the legal ground for such exclusion, indicating that the 
exclusion is permissible among Members with a FTA with one another.116  The Appellate 
Body avoided making any ruling on this issue by stating that it did not want to “prejudge” 
Article XXIV issue.117  Nevertheless, if the previous Article XXIV analysis by this Panel 
would be ultimately correct, the exclusion of imports from a country without the existence of a 
free trading agreement with it can be considered violating the parallelism requirement under 
Article 2.2 because it will not have the Article XXIV justification limited to the members of 
116 United States – Line Pipe, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, paras 7.135 – 7.163.
117 United States – Line Pipe, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 198.
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free trade areas.  In fact, permitting selective applications of a safeguard measure against 
imports from one or a small number of countries without any justifying apparatus such as a 
FTA would seem to undermine the agreement on the MFN safeguards application that was 
finally reached after decades of treacherous debates and negotiations.118
4. Injury Assessment
a. Consideration of injury factors
A safeguard measure is predicated on the existence / threat of serious injury to the domestic 
industry caused by increase in imports.119 The injury determination is not a precise science and 
cannot avoid certain degree of subjectivity altogether.  Nonetheless, clear guidelines and 
criteria for the injury determination can reduce arbitrariness in the injury determination.  The 
Agreement on Safeguards attempts to provide such criteria for the injury determination.  
Article 4.2(a) of the SA provides, 
“In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have caused or are 
threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry under the terms of this 
Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective 
and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, 
the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and 
relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in 
the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and 
employment.”  (Emphasis added.)
Unlike its predecessor, Article XIX, the SA specifies eight injury factors, as underlined above, 
for the assessment of injury.   The legal nature of those injury factors was at issue: i.e. whether 
118
 For the long negotiation process of the SA, see Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN 
WORLD TRADE, supra note 1, chapter 3.
119
 Article 2.1 of the SA, supra note 42.
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those factors were illustrated as examples that the national investigating authorities may 
consider or their consideration is mandatory.  The previous panels and the Appellate Body 
found that the consideration of every single factor listed above is mandatory and should not be 
omitted.120  These specific injury factors were modelled after the U.S. legislation121 although 
they are not identical to those included in the U.S. legislation.
In U.S. Steel Safeguards, some of the injury factors specified in Article 4.2(b) were omitted 
from the consideration of the USITC.  For instance, the changes in productivity were not 
analysed in the USITC investigation report.122  The analysis of productivity would have been 
relevant in this case, as the decrease in the employment in the steel sector was widely argued 
as indicative of injury to the U.S. steel industry.123   If, however, this alleged decrease in 
employment was correlated with any increase in productivity: i.e. if an improvement in labor-
saving production technology actually caused the decrease in employment, the decrease in 
employment may have to be considered in a different light.  
It is not to argue here conclusively that the decrease in employment was in fact caused by the 
improvement of technology.  Rather, the point is that any change in productivity should have 
been analysed as it may have affected the injury determination.  Curiously, the complainants 
120 Korea – Dairy Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 7.55, Argentina –
Footwear, Report of the Panel, supra note supra note 43, para. 8.206, Report of the Appellate 
Body, supra note supra note 43, para. 136.
121
 Trade Act of 1974, §§ 202(c)(1)(A) and 202(c)(1)(B).
122 Steel, USITC Pub. No. 3479 (December 2001)
123 See the relevant discussions in section II.1 supra.
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did not raise this issue in the panel and the Appellate Body proceedings.  If they had, it would 
have been likely that the omission of the injury factor specified in Article 4.2(a) was 
considered violation of Article 4, as such omissions were considered violation by the previous 
panels and the Appellate Body.124
Unlike in Article 4.2(a), productivity is not found in the U.S. legislation among the listed 
factors with respect to serious injury.125 This absence perhaps explains why the USITC did not 
analyze productivity. The injury factors need not be identical between the national legislation 
and the SA to achieve conformity with the WTO requirement.  For instance, the safeguard 
provisions of the EC include more injury factors than those of the SA.126  Raising the bar for 
the safeguard applications by requiring more than is prescribed in the SA, as has been done for 
the EC rules, does not render safeguard measures, that have been applied in pursuant to the 
domestic rules, incompatible with the WTO requirements.  The opposite, however, may lead to 
the failure of compliance with the SA.  Nothing in the U.S. legislation prohibits the USITC 
from considering more injury factors than what is specified there.  Therefore, the USITC could 
have considered all the factors specifically listed under Article 4.2(a), regardless of their 
presence in the U.S. legislation. 
b. Causation
124 Supra note 120.
125
 On the other hand, productivity is included with respect to a threat of serious injury. See 
supra note 121.
126
 European Union Council Regulation No. 3285/94, art. 10.
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The application of a safeguard measure will be hardly justifiable unless the injury to the 
domestic industry is in fact caused by the increase in imports.  The SA also requires a Member 
applying a safeguard measure to establish a causal link between the injury and the increase in 
imports.  Article 4.2(b) of the SA provides,
“The determination referred to in subparagraph (a) (injury determination) shall not be 
made unless this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the 
existence of the causal link between increased imports of the product concerned and 
serious injury or threat thereof.  When factors other than increased imports are causing 
injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to 
increased imports.” (Explanations added.)
The previous panels and the Appellate Body have provided interpretive guides to this 
provision requiring causation.  The Panel in Argentina – Footwear prescribed a three-pronged 
test for the determination of causation.127  The first prong of the test requires the coincidence 
between an upward trend in imports and downward trends in the injury factors.  If no such 
coincidence is found, there must be a reasoned explanation as to why the data nevertheless 
show causation.  The second is whether the conditions of competition in the domestic market 
between imported and domestic products demonstrate a causal link between the imports and 
any injury on the basis of objective evidence.  Lastly, the Panel shall assess whether other 
relevant factors have been analyzed and whether it is established that any injury caused by 
factors other than the imports has not been attributed to the imports (non-attribution 
requirement).  With regard to the sufficiency of causation, the Appellate Body also ruled that it 
127 Argentina – Footwear, supra note 43, Report of the Panel, para. 8.229.  The Appellate 
Body affirmed this test, Argentina – Footwear, supra note 43, Report of the Appellate Body, 
paras 140-146.  This test was also followed by the subsequent Panel in United States – Wheat 
Gluten, supra note 43, Panel Report, para. 8.91.
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is enough to establish the required causal link if the increase in imports made a sufficiently 
clear contribution to the injury although the increase in imports alone could have not caused 
the injury.128
The Panel in U.S. Steel Safeguards found that this causation requirement was not met with 
respect to all product categories except one.129  The Panel considered that the USITC failed to 
establish the coincidence between the increasing trends in imports and decreasing trends in the 
injury factors and also failed to provide any other compelling argument as to why the causal 
link nevertheless existed.130  The USITC’s analysis of competition between imports and 
domestic products was not adequate, and it also failed to properly separate and assess the 
nature and extent of the injurious effects of factors other than increased imports by improperly 
dismissing a number of factors (i.e., declining domestic demand, domestic capacity increases, 
128United States – Wheat Gluten, supra note 43, Appellate Body Report, para. 67. According 
to the Appellate Body, the last sentence of Article 4.2(b) (non-attribution requirement) requires 
the national authorities to examine the existence of “a genuine and substantial relationship of 
cause and effect” between the increase in imports and the injury and distinguish injurious 
effects caused by the other factors from that by the increase in imports. United States – Wheat 
Gluten, supra note 43, Appellate Body Report, para. 69.  For further discussions of the 
causation test, see Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 1, at 48-49, 
132-134
129
 The Panel considered that the causation requirement was not met with respect to CCFRS, 
tin mill products, hot-rolled bar, cold-finished bar, rebar, welded-pipe, FFTJ, stainless steel 
bar, stainless steel wire. United States – Steel Products, supra note 43, Report of the Panel, 
paras 10.419, 10.422, 10.445, 10.469, 10.487, 10.503, 10.536, 10.569, 10.573.  For stainless 
steel rod, the Panel considered that the USITC’s causation analysis was not inconsistent with 
the requirement under Article 4.2(b). Id, para. 10.586.
130
 For CCFRS, the Panel did not consider that the USITC’s selective use of data of the 
constituent items of the CCFRS and not the whole CCFRS was adequate without establishing 
that those selective items were representative of the whole CCFRS.  Id., paras 10.378-10.380. 
The Panel provided measure-by- measure analyses for all product categories.  Id., paras 10.361-
10.586.
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intra-industry competition and legacy costs) in its non-attribution analysis although it 
acknowledged that those factors were causing injury to the industry.131
For tin mill products and stainless steel wire, the Panel noted that there were conflicting 
opinions among the USITC Commissioners as to the existence of the requisite causation based 
on the different product definitions.132  The Panel found that “a Member is not permitted to 
base its safeguard measures on an explanation that consists of alternative explanations which, 
given the different products upon which such explanations are based, cannot be reconciled as a 
matter of substance.”133  Here, the Appellate Body, without deciding whether the USITC’s 
explanation of the causation was adequate, ruled that the Panel’s dismissal of the USITC’s 
analysis based on the Commissioners’ divergent opinions was not justifiable, applying the 
same reasoning that it did in the discussion of the increased imports with respect to those two 
product categories.134
5. Notification and Consultation
As safeguard measures are applicable unilaterally without any existence of unfair practice on 
the part of exporters135, their application will inevitably upset the balance of concessions 
131 Id.
132
 The Panel made the same observations with regard to the increase in imports as discussed 
supra.
133 United States – Steel Products, supra note 43, Report of the Panel, paras 10.422, 10.572.   
134 United States – Steel Products, supra note 43, Report of the Appellate Body, paras 492, 
493.  Refer to the relevant discussion in increased imports supra.  The same concern about this 
Appellate Body ruling as expressed in that discussion is also applicable here.
135
 The application is subject to the general condition under Article 2 of the SA as well as the 
other requirements under the SA and GATT Article XIX.
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between the exporting and importing Members.   Therefore, from the standpoint of the 
exporting Members, the investigation and the application of safeguard measures need to be 
promptly notified so that the exporting Members are made aware of the progress of these 
measures which may significantly affect their export interests.  Article 12 of the SA requires 
Members to notify the WTO Committee on Safeguards at the various stages of a safeguard 
investigation: at the initiation of the investigation (Article 12.1(a)); upon the finding of serious 
injury or threat thereof (Article 12.1(b)); and finally, upon the decision to apply or extend a 
safeguard measure (Article 12.1(c)). Article 12.1 also requires that the required notifications 
must be made immediately after the relevant decisions.  
With respect to the timing of notifications, the previous panel considered that Article 12.1(c) 
notification must be made well before the implementation of the measure since the notification 
should provide the exporting Members with the sufficient time to prepare and enter into 
consultations with the Member applying the safeguard measure prior to its application.136
Article 12.3 provides,
“A Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure shall provide adequate 
opportunity for prior consultations with those Members having a substantial interest as 
exporters of the product concerned, with a view to, inter alia, reviewing the information 
under paragraph 2, exchanging views on the measure and reaching an understanding 
on ways to achieve the objective set out in paragraph 1 of Article 8.”
The consultation is an essential part of the procedural requirement of safeguards.  
Consultations enable the importing and exporting Members to exchange views on the proposed 
136 United States – Wheat Glutten, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, paras 8.205-
8.207.
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measure for the prospective of reaching a mutually satisfactory settlement and maintain the 
balance of concessions.  The timing of consultation is important to achieve those ends.  
Members proposing to apply a safeguard measure will need to hold those consultations well 
before the implementation of a safeguard measure so that the results of those consultations can 
be considered and incorporated in the final implementation of safeguards.  Members are not 
required to modify or withdraw their measures following the consultations, but the adequate 
effort to accommodate the interests and concerns of the Members affected by the safeguards 
would minimize the potential for disputes and retaliations.137
The adequacy of consultations was at issue in the previous safeguard cases. In Line Pipe, the
Appellate Body held that the United States did not provide an adequate opportunity for 
consultations where the measures applied after the consultations were substantially different 
from those that had been informed at the consultations.138  The United States argued that the 
complaining party would have been able to request new consultations after the announcement 
of the final measure, but the Appellate Body considered that the period of 18 days between the 
announcement of the final U.S. measure and its implementation was not considered sufficient 
for entering into new consultations.139
137
 For more discussions in this issue, see Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE,
supra note 43, chapters 11.2 and 11.3.
138 United States – Line Pipe, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, paras 102 – 113.
139 Id., paras 107-108.
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In U.S. Steel Safeguards, the United States implemented the measures only 15 days after its 
announcement of the measures.140  This time period is even less than the one (18 days) in Line 
Pipe above, which was subsequently considered inadequately short by the Appellate Body.141
Surprisingly, this issue was not brought up by the complainants in the panel proceedings.  Had 
they have done so, this inadequately short time between the announcement and the 
implementation would have been likely considered a violation of Article 12.   In fact, the lack 
of the genuine effort to provide an adequate consultation opportunity and to reach a mutually 
agreeable settlement contributed to the rapid escalation of crisis in U.S. Steel Safeguards, as 
manifested by the several retaliation proposals from the exporting Members.
IV. CONCLUSION – TEST OF MULTILATERALISM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Safeguard measures are widely considered the most protective of all trade measures due to 
their unilateral applicability without the requirement of any unfair trade practice on the part of 
the exporters. Safeguard measures will inevitably upset the balance of concessions reached 
among Members during the previous trade negotiations.  For this reason, safeguard measures 
are prone to invite disputes and potential retaliations, particularly where the legal justifications 
under the relevant WTO rules are weak and where adequate efforts to reach a satisfactory 
settlement between the exporting and importing Members are not made.   To minimize the 
danger of this potentially very abusive measure, the multilateral framework is in place, 
including the prior consultation requirements.
140 See also, Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra
note 1, at 167-168.
141 Supra note 139.
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Did this multilateral framework indeed work in U.S. Steel Safeguards?   It did not seem 
initially.  There was serious doubt as to whether the United States had complied with the 
requirements of the SA.  As discussed above, the United States applied a series of safeguard 
measures to a wide range of steel products where it was not even clear that the basic premises 
for the application of a safeguard measure, such as the increase in imports and the causation 
between the injury and imports, existed at all.  It was widely believed that the political needs, 
rather than the economic necessities backed by the legal justifications, prompted the 
application of the Steel Safeguards.142 Political motivations do not necessarily make 
safeguards incompatible with the requirements of the SA and Article XIX, but the lack of
essential legal conditions do.
The subsequent crisis in U.S. Steel Safeguards, which brought out the danger of a worldwide 
trade war, began with the rushed manner of the U.S. government into the rapid application of 
the Steel Safeguards without providing adequate consultation opportunities.143 It suggested 
that the U.S. government did not seriously contemplate the need of those consultations under 
Article 12 of the SA and the possible consequences of neglecting them.  Such rush and neglect 
142
 A renowned economist considered that the steel safeguards would not improve the 
condition of the U.S. steel industry.  See Robert J, Barro, Big Steel Doesn’t Need Any More 
Popping Up, BUSINESS WEEK, April 1, 2001, at 24.  It has been also reported that the U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Paul H. O’Neill stated in the off-the-record comments after a dinner speech 
at the Council on Foreign Relations that the steel safeguards would cost more jobs in the 
United States than it would save.  NEW YORK TIMES, March 16, 2002, at A1.  Refer to the 
relevant discussions in the section II.1 supra for the political background of U.S. Steel 
Safeguards.
143 See the relevant discussion on the issue of notifications and consultations in section III.5 
supra.
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may have been caused by internal political pressure144, but they came too high a price, such as 
the strong worldwide condemnations against the U.S. measures, which undermined its 
credibility as a global leader of free trade, filing of complaints at the WTO by more nations 
than in any other dispute in the GATT/WTO history as well as proposal of several retaliations 
by major economies around the world.145
As the dispute progressed, the multilateral framework in place within the world trading system 
was brought to function and eventually averted this crisis.  The retaliation proposals by the 
exporting Members were made in accordance with the relevant SA provisions, and the 
exporting Members refrained themselves from applying retaliations until the resolution of 
another important multilateral device of dispute settlements, the WTO panel and the Appellate 
Body proceedings.146  Facing several retaliation proposals, the United States also entered into 
consultations with some exporting Members and agreed to reduce steel products from its
safeguard list.147  The multilateral framework was finally shown operational and resolved this 
dispute when the United States accepted the WTO DSB decision, although it ruled against all 
of its measures, and withdrew them subsequently despite significant internal political pressure 
144
 An immediate and comprehensive import relief was demanded by the steel industry. 
Recommended Action to Solve the Steel Import Crisis, May 9, 2001, Proposal by the Steel 
Manufacturers Association.
145 See the relevant discussions in section II.2 supra.
146
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“Dispute 
Settlement Understanding” or “DSU”) governs the proceedings of the panel as well as of the 
Appellate Body.  WTO, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 2, at 404-433.
147 See the relevant discussions in section II.2 supra.
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against it.148   The respect for the multilateral framework of international trade was restored 
and the multilateralism endured a difficult test, which could have escalated to a worldwide 
trade war.
The development of U.S. Steel Safeguards has demonstrated how important it is for Members 
to adhere to the multilateral framework of the international trading system including due 
compliance with the WTO legal requirements.  The initial neglect of the multilateral 
framework in U.S. Steel Safeguards brought the international community to a major trade 
dispute involving virtually all major economies in the world.  The U.S. effort in negotiations 
subsequent to its application of safeguards helped resolving the crisis149, but such crisis may 
have never been borne out in the first place had the United States considered the multilateral 
framework more seriously and conducted the prior consultations under Article 12 adequately 
with the notifications sufficiently in advance. The properly conducted Article 12 consultations 
may have led to the same negotiation results albeit without the serious disputes in progress 
under the threat of retaliations.  
The improper application of safeguards without valid legal justifications may also tempt other 
Members to do the same in order to protect their own export interests by applying safeguards-
148
 The exporting Members also followed the suit, and the proposed retaliations were never 
applied.
149 See the relevant discussions in section II.2 supra.
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in-response, as witnessed in U.S. Steel Safeguards,150 creating a chain of worldwide 
protectionism. Ironically, this will eventually return to undermine the export interests of the 
Member applying the safeguard measure in the first place.  Retaliations will cause more 
immediate damage to the export interests of the Member applying the safeguard.151  In U.S. 
Steel Safeguards, the proposed retaliations were never entered into practice as the United 
States withdrew all its measures in acceptance of the WTO DSB decision.
U.S. Steel Safeguards is as a notable example of politically motivated trade measures applied 
initially without clear legal justifications under the relevant WTO rules and without due regard 
to the multilateral framework of the safeguards, which could have been led to a full scale trade 
war.152  Nonetheless, the consolation may be found in that the successful resolution of this 
highly publicized dispute has in fact strengthened rather than weakened the multilateral 
framework of the WTO in the end.  Also, U.S. Steel Safeguards has left us a clear lesson that 
the failure to duly recognize and respect the multilateral framework of international trade in 
the application of a trade measure, including its legal requirements, will invite costly disputes 
150
 As discussed above, some Members including European Communities and China also 
applied safeguard measures against their import of steel products subsequent to U.S. Steel 
Safeguards to prevent “diversion” of steel exports from the U.S. market protected from the 
Steel Safeguards. Id.
151
 As safeguards are applied without any unfair trade practice on the part of the exporters, the 
exporting Member is allowed to suspend, when it failed to reach agreement on compensation 
with the importing Member, the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other 
obligations under Article 1994 to the trade of the Member applying the measure (retaliatory 
measure). Agreement on Safeguards, art. 8.2. However, Article 8.3 suspends the right to 
retaliation for three years if the safeguard is applied based on an absolute increase in imports 
and the measure conforms to the SA.  In other words, this suspension is not imposed where the 
safeguard is not consistent with the requirement of the SA. 
152 See the relevant discussions in section II.2 supra.
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down the road, such as the one witnessed in this case.
